We Release Our First Actual Industry Report on Upcoming 2.5 GHz Auction.Go us and buy our stuff!

Fellow Wetmachiner and all around spectrum genius Dr.Gregory Rose has written a report on the upcoming FCC Auction 86 in the 2.5 GHz BRS Band. Dubbed “The WiMAX Band: (2.5 GHz): Characteristics, Technology, Major Spectrum Holders in the BRS-EBS Service and Prospects for Auction 86, and edited by Harold Feld, this report contains information vital to understanding how the evolution of the 2.5 GHz band and the FCC auction beginning at the end of October will shape WiMAX Deployment in the United States. Resources with the Report include:

A Searchable Database of All BRS and EBS Licensees and Spectrum Lessees. Anyone who has used the FCC’s Universal License Service knows how difficult it is to search for even basic information. The master database takes all the information and puts it into an easily searched Excel® spreadsheet.

Special breakout tables and coverage maps for Clearwire and Sprint. Convenient tables and coverage maps show the coverage and relationships of these WiMAX giants.

• Analysis of the top 35 other providers. The report also lists the top 35 licensees in the band after Sprint and Clearwire, describing their general market areas and what their spectrum holdings say about their strategies.

The report cost $499 until FCC Auction 86 beginson October 27, at which point it goes up to $799. Those purchasing at $499 may buy the post-Auction update, scheduled to come out 3 months after Auction 86 closes, for a savings of $200 off the full post-auction price.

Copies of the report are available for sale at Broadbandcensus.com and at Muniwireless. Click HERE to get your copy today!

To see the full press release, click here.

To read the executive summary for free,click here.

Stay tuned . . . .

tags: wimax, wimax band, 2.5 GHz, wireless, spectrum, wimax report, wimax auction, fcc, fcc auction, fcc auction 86, harold feld, gregory rose, strength to strength develop-ed.

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Shout Out for New Econ Blog

For those who subscribe to Tales of the Sausage Factory but not Wetmachine Main, I thought I would let you all know that my friend and ace economist Dr. Gregory Rose has started a new blog here at wetmachine called Econoklastic. You can read his first post here. Regular readers will recognize Greg’s name as the author of several spectrum studies that I quote incessantly, such as the ones describing how SpectrumCo and its wireless allies blocked competitors from getting licenses in last year’s AWS auction.

As you can tell from his first post, Greg is quite contrarian and willing to grind more than a few sacred cows into hamburger. It’s why we like to keep him around.

Stay tuned . . . .

Dr. Rose Proves It Was Spectrum Co. In The Kitchen With the Candlestick . . .

My good friend Dr. Gregory Rose has released two studies on last summer’s AWS Auction. I just bloged about them at length over at the Public Knowledge policy blog. So rather than repeat myself, I will merely say:

I argued after the AWS auction that cable companies and wireless incumbents had used the auction to kill DBS as a competitor. Rose proves that in his first report,
How Incumbents Blocked New Entrants In The AWS-1 Auction: Lessons For The Future.

Rose’s second report, Tacit Collusion In The AWS Auction: The Signalling Problem, looks at the use of bids to communicate. Again, as I’ve argued before, only by adopting anonymous bidding rules can the FCC stop bidders from suing the auction process to signal each other.

For the rest of my commentary, check out my PK blog.

Stay tuned . . . .

But Do Spectrum Auctions *Really* Suck? According to Center for American Progress Report, You bet!

In all the hustle and bustle, it rather blew by that my friends Dr. Gregory Rose and Mark Lloyd have written this analysis of ten years of FCC spectrum auction data.

Summary — FCC auctions turn out to be great ways for incumbents to exclude new entrants and to bilk the government. They do not yield the promised efficiencies of distribution or even maximize revenue to the government. There are ways to improve the process, but the FCC open ascending auction systems just about ensures that a collection of incumbents can keep out any genuinely disruptive competitors and collude to minimize revenue to the government and maintain the status quo.

 

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